| Australia's defense planners are currently | | | | long range (even longer than the Collins class) and a |
| contemplating the acquisition of new submarines to | | | | strategic strike (ie cruise missile) capability. Like with the |
| secure Australia's defense capabilities into the second | | | | Collins class, the specifications are drawn up to ensure |
| half of this century. It is likely, however, that these | | | | that they can assist the US Navy. As a result, they will |
| submarines will be bought for the wrong reason; they | | | | be inordinately expensive, estimated at over A$3 billion |
| will be the wrong type; and with the wrong design. | | | | each. A$36 billion for 12 boats. Excessive range (so |
| The Wrong Reason - Australia's current submarines, | | | | they can operate with US Naval Task Forces) and the |
| the Collins class, are a disaster. Of six commissioned, | | | | ability to launch cruise missiles (a capability which will |
| only one is currently operational. They were chosen | | | | held by Australia's new Joint Strike Fighters), results in |
| for the wrong reason. Australia chose a long-range | | | | a cost disproportionate to the benefits to Australia. |
| and multi-tasked boat, capable of assisting the US | | | | Australia would be better served by procuring smaller |
| Navy in its Pacific Ocean operations. But this choice | | | | and cheaper submarines, fitted out to defend |
| begs the question: should Australian defense dollars be | | | | Australia's interests, not America's. |
| spent to further American, or Australian national | | | | The Wrong Design - The Defense White Paper sets |
| interests? | | | | out a long list of high-level specifications for the new |
| Since W.W.2, Australia's obsequious support of US | | | | submarines.Tailor-made to these Australian |
| foreign policy has led to ignominious adventures in | | | | requirements, there will be no sales to other navies. |
| Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, and the deaths of | | | | Familiar ring? Yes- the Collins class submarines have |
| hundreds of Australian servicemen. Australia owes it | | | | the same provenance. And because the Collins class |
| to herself to purchase submarines which support | | | | submarines were uniquely Australian, they were untried |
| Australian, rather than American interests. Australia's | | | | and failed.They failed technically, and had major cost |
| national interests are increasingly separating from | | | | and delivery over-runs. Low mechanical readiness has |
| those of America, and are being drawn towards China. | | | | exacerbated crew retention issues. |
| China is Australia's largest trading partner, and will soon | | | | Instead of designing submarines from scratch, Australia |
| be the world's richest country. By the time the new | | | | should purchase proven submarines. They could still be |
| submarines are fully operational (some time after | | | | built in Australia. Buying submarines which are already |
| 2030), China will rival the US as a military power, and | | | | operating with other navies reduces the risk of failure. |
| will certainly exceed the US as a Pacific military power. | | | | And it means the purchase decision can be made |
| It would be foolhardy for Australia to choose its next | | | | considerably later, and take advantage of new |
| submarines based on a desire for an interoperability of | | | | technology and with a clearer picture of Australia's |
| the Australian and US navies. | | | | security imperatives. |
| The Wrong Type - The Australian Defense White | | | | Australia should buy proven submarines. To do |
| Paper, released in May 2009, specifies the | | | | otherwise puts Australia's security at risk. |
| requirements for the new submarines. These include a | | | | |